EU-India relations at strategic crossroads - OPINION
By Aytan Aliyeva
The relationship between the European Union and India dates back to 1962, when India became one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the then European Economic Community. Cooperation initially focused on trade and development assistance, but deepened significantly after India’s economic liberalization in the 1990s. A major milestone was reached in 2004 with the launch of the Strategic Partnership, followed by regular EU–India Summits that broadened cooperation to include climate change, science and technology, education, and counter-terrorism. Trade relations intensified further with the start of negotiations on a Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement in 2007, although talks stalled in the following decade due to regulatory and market-access differences. Renewed geopolitical convergence led to a revitalization of ties, culminating in the 2020 EU -India Summit, which adopted a roadmap for cooperation until 2025, and the 2021 EU - India Connectivity Partnership. Since 2022, negotiations on a free trade agreement and investment protection have resumed, reflecting the growing strategic, economic, and political importance of EU-India relations in the contemporary international system.
EU official visit: Symbolism and strategic milestones
The official visit of the European Union to India from 25 to 27 January 2026 took place in a highly symbolic and strategic context. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa were invited as chief guests to India’s 77th Republic Day celebrations, which emphasized the importance that both parties attach to strengthening political, economic, and strategic relations. The visit reached in the 16th EU-India Summit on 27 January 2026 in New Delhi, where a series of significant agreements were concluded. Most notably, India and the EU signed a historic Free Trade Agreement (FTA), bringing to an end nearly two decades of negotiations. EU leaders described the agreement as the “mother of all deals” due to its scale and strategic impact. The FTA is comprehensive, covering approximately 97-99% of tariff lines by value, and will reduce tariffs on most traded goods, including automobiles, machinery, textiles, leather products, wine, and pharmaceuticals. It is expected to save EU exporters around 4 billion euros in tariffs annually, while offering substantially improved access to the EU market for India’s export sectors, particularly textiles, marine products, and other labour-intensive industries. The agreement links economies that together account for around 25% of global GDP and nearly one-third of global trade. Bilateral trade is expected to grow significantly by 2030 as integration across goods and services deepens. However, before it can enter into force, the FTA must still be ratified by the European Parliament, EU member states, and India’s domestic authorities, a process expected to conclude in 2026–27. In addition to trade, the summit produced a Mobility and Migration Agreement, which is designed to simplify visa procedures for students, researchers and skilled professionals. This agreement includes the establishment of an EU 'Legal Gateway Office' in New Delhi, which will support visa applications, recognition of qualifications and access to information on EU labour markets. Security cooperation was also strengthened through the formalization of a Security and Defence Partnership framework, which expands collaboration in areas such as maritime security, cybersecurity, counter-terrorism, emerging technologies, capacity building, and defence procurement. This shift moves beyond earlier sectoral dialogues towards a more structured, strategic approach. The visit also resulted in the adoption of a joint India - EU comprehensive strategic agenda for 2030, along with administrative arrangements for advanced electronic signatures and regulatory cooperation to support digital trade. Other outcomes included a memorandum of understanding between India's central bank (RBI) and the European Securities and Markets Authority to enhance financial cooperation, an agreement on disaster management cooperation, and the establishment of a green hydrogen task force to promote clean energy development and investment. Overall, the outcomes of the summit had strong geopolitical significance, as they reaffirmed a commitment to a rules-based international order and closer cooperation amid shifting global dynamics involving the United States, China, and Indo-Pacific security.
Criticisms and challenges to the legitimacy of the visit
EU official visit to India has been criticized from several sides, both within the European Union and internationally, for a combination of political, normative, and strategic reasons.
Firstly, criticism has focused on human rights and democratic standards. Civil society organizations, members of the European Parliament and human rights groups have argued that the EU has played down concerns about democratic regression, restrictions on civil liberties and media freedom, and the treatment of minorities in India. Critics saw the EU leaders' participation as chief guests in India’s Republic Day celebrations as a strong symbolic endorsement of the Indian government, as these issues were not sufficiently addressed publicly, which could weaken the EU’s credibility as a normative power that promotes human rights and the rule of law.
Secondly, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has been accused of prioritizing economic and geopolitical interests over social and environmental safeguards. Trade unions, NGOs and some political groups in Europe argue that the agreement lacks strong, enforceable provisions regarding labor rights, environmental protection and climate commitments. There are also concerns that increased market access could negatively affect sensitive sectors, small producers, and labor-intensive industries on both sides while benefiting large corporations unfairly.
Thirdly, the visit has been criticized for its perceived geopolitical motivations, particularly the idea that the EU is engaging with India primarily as a way to balance against China. Critics argue that this strategic calculus risks turning the partnership into a transactional alliance driven by Indo-Pacific security concerns rather than shared values. According to this view, the EU’s emphasis on strategic autonomy and supply-chain diversification may be at the expense of principled foreign policy.
Fourthly, concerns have been raised about the process and transparency. Some EU parliamentarians and stakeholders claim that the negotiations leading up to the FTA and related agreements were not transparent enough, and that democratic oversight, especially by the European Parliament, was limited at the summit stage despite the fact that the agreement still requires ratification.
Lastly, some domestic critics in India argue that the FTA could expose vulnerable sectors to European competition too rapidly, thereby constraining policy space in areas such as industrial development, digital regulation and agriculture.
This criticism reflects the broader tension in EU-India relations between strategic pragmatism and normative commitments. While supporters view the visit as strengthening a key global partnership at a necessary and timely moment, critics see it as a case of economic and geopolitical interests overtaking values-based diplomacy.
Labour migration and structural risks for the EU
The discussion on facilitating the entry of Indian migrants into the European Union as part of the labour force is politically sensitive and is likely to be accepted unevenly across EU member states, reflecting their differing labour market needs, migration politics and public attitudes.
At the EU level, however, the policy logic is clear: many member states are facing acute labour shortages as a result of ageing populations, low birth rates and skills gaps in sectors such as healthcare, IT, engineering, construction, logistics and hospitality. From this perspective, regulated labour migration from India, especially of skilled and semi-skilled workers, is considered by the European Commission and several governments to be economically necessary and strategically preferable to irregular migration. Instruments such as the revised EU Blue Card, skills partnerships, and the new EU-India mobility framework are designed to enable legal pathways while maintaining national control.
However, acceptance varies sharply among member states. Countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden and Portugal are generally more receptive as they actively seek foreign labour and have experience of integrating third-country workers. These states frame Indian labour migration in economic and demographic terms, emphasizing skills matching, language requirements, and controlled admission mechanisms. In contrast, several Central and Eastern European states, including Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, as well as some in Southern Europe, remain more cautious or resistant. Their concerns stem from domestic political opposition to migration, fears of challenges to social integration, pressure on welfare systems, and broader public scepticism towards non-EU immigration.
Public opinion will also play a decisive role. In several member states, migration is closely linked to debates on identity, security, and social cohesion. Even where employers strongly support labour migration, governments may face domestic backlash, especially if economic conditions deteriorate or far-right parties mobilize the issue electorally. Consequently, policymakers are likely to stress temporary, skills-based, and circular migration, along with strong return and readmission clauses, to reassure voters.
The debate on recruiting Indian workers for the European Union has led to renewed comparisons with the labour recruitment agreements signed with Turkey in the early 1960s, particularly those with Germany. While this historical reference is instructive, the two models differ in intent and structure. The Turkish 'guest worker' agreements emerged in a post-war industrial context characterized by rapid economic growth and severe labour shortages in unskilled manufacturing. Although migration was intended to be temporary, it lacked effective return mechanisms and underestimated the long-term social consequences of settlement and family reunification. Over time, the gap between the design of these policies and their implementation produced enduring challenges relating to integration, social cohesion and political contestation across Europe. In contrast, the current discussion on Indian labour migration is grounded in a far more regulated and reflective policy landscape, shaped by decades of institutional learning. Rather than mass recruitment, the EU approach emphasises selective, skills-based mobility targeted at sectors such as information technology, healthcare, engineering, research and technical services. These sectors correspond to Europe's contemporary economic structure and ageing demographics. The choice of India reflects a number of factors that were absent in the Turkish case of the 1960s: These include India's young and educated workforce, widespread English proficiency, internationally recognized qualifications, and a strong track record of diaspora integration in several EU member states. Furthermore, labour mobility with India is considered a key part of a wider strategic partnership that includes trade, digital transformation, climate cooperation, and geopolitical alignment in the Indo-Pacific region. However, it is important to note that migration governance remains primarily a national competence, with EU-level frameworks designed to preserve member-state control over the number of migrants, the duration of their stay, and the conditions under which they can work.
The lack of clear information regarding the design, scale and governance of Indian labour migration to the European Union is a critical vulnerability in itself, as historical experience shows that migration policy uncertainty often yields outcomes that differ greatly from the original intentions. Labour migration that becomes structurally embedded is extremely difficult to contain through policy instruments alone, regardless of initial intentions. In many respects, the cultural, religious, linguistic and social distance between Indian migrants and host societies in Europe is greater than that experienced with Turkish migrants in the post-war period. While Turkey shared geographic proximity and long-standing historical ties with Europe, as well as partial cultural familiarity through earlier migration, India is perceived by many European publics as a far more heterogeneous and visibly 'non-European' society. In the current political climate, which is marked by the rise of populist, nationalist and far-right parties in several EU member states, large-scale or poorly managed Indian migration could easily become a focal point for political mobilisation. Migration debates are no longer framed primarily around labour needs, but around identity, race, social cohesion and perceived threats to national culture, making societal acceptance far more fragile than in the 1960s.
Another critical issue concerns integration capacity. European integration systems, such as language training, housing, education and labour-market absorption, are already under strain in many countries. Without substantial investment and long-term planning, even skilled migration can generate parallel communities rather than integration, particularly if migrants concentrate in specific sectors or urban areas. In addition, there is a risk of segmented labour markets, where Indian migrants are channelled into specific sectors with limited upward mobility, reproducing patterns of structural inequality similar to those experienced by earlier migrant groups.
There are also external ethical and geopolitical risks. The large-scale recruitment of Indian professionals, particularly in healthcare, engineering and research, raises concerns about brain drain and uneven development. This could weaken the EU’s commitment to sustainable partnerships. Conversely, if migration becomes implicitly linked to trade or geopolitical alignment, it could be viewed as the instrumentalisation of people as strategic resources rather than the recognition of mobility as a rights-based process, which would further damage public trust.
In my view, the success or failure of the EU's approach will depend less on whether it engages with India as a labour partner, and more on how clearly and transparently the policy is defined. Any approach resembling the Turkish labour model would almost certainly provoke political opposition and strengthen anti-immigration movements, which could destabilize EU societies rather than supporting their economies. For Indian labour mobility to be viable, it must remain small-scale, strictly skills-based, time-bound and nationally controlled, with strong integration targets and transparent communication with the public. Without these safeguards, the policy risks repeating historical mistakes in far more hostile political conditions where tolerance margins are lower and identity politics are far more potent than they were years ago.
The consequences of this official visit - its symbolism, protocol and mutual expectations will become more visible and tangible in the EU and India. Such visits are never purely ceremonial; they send signals to domestic audiences, international partners and markets. As negotiations move to bureaucratic and parliamentary arenas, underlying tensions will surface.
